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Twenty years ago, amid a great fanfare of enthusiasm, the Treaty of Maastricht 
created the European union and inaugurated the process for creating a single 
European currency for most of the then members (except the UK and Sweden, 
and later Denmark, that were given a temporary exemption) and all future 
members. Twenty years later, the anniversary of the treaty passed almost 
unnoticed (EUROPEAN POLICY CENTER, 2012). On that day, however, the 
impact of the treaty was never far from the headlines, as had also been the case 
for almost every day over the previous months. The Lehman brothers 
bankruptcy in September 2008 not only triggered a financial crisis that 
threatened to engulf the world, but it set in motion a series of shocks that have 
since reverberated through the Euro-area. It is fair to say that the crisis-
management has not been an example of stream-lined efficiency, and there are 
lessons to be learned from that experience.  
However, the development of the Euro, and the crisis that has 
subsequently engulfed it, holds lessons in another direction. The European 
Union has long been held as a model, or an inspiration, for other experiments in 
regional cooperation and integration, including Mercosul, ASEAN and SADC. 
The model embodied a sequence of steps leading to ‘ever closer union’ that 
moved from a free trade area through a customs union and a single market and 
culminated in economic and monetary union. With the signing and 
implementation of the Treaty of Maastricht, the European Union had 
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embarked on the penultimate step in this progression. But only half of it – a 
monetary union without a fiscal union. The Euro-crisis has now called that 
achievement into question and, in the process, undermined the authority of 
those espousing a European route towards closer integration, both for 
themselves as well as for other nations. As a convinced federalist, myself, I 
would not recommend abandoning the European example altogether, but if 
there is a lesson to be learned from this sorry episode, it is this: “if you are going 
to do it, do not do it this way”. 
This article examines the European experience with economic and 
monetary union from three perspectives – the design, the implementation and 
the management of the euro – before exploring the implications of the current 
crisis. 
 
The Design 
The decision to embark on the path towards economic and monetary union was 
taken after a period of remarkable exchange-rate stability in Western Europe. 
Introduced in 1979, it built on the experience of the exchange-rate mechanism 
(ERM) which had tied members exchange rates to a band of 2.25 per cent either 
side of par (except for Italy which was given a band of 6 per cent) and which 
had enhanced central bank cooperation to maintain the parities. Its 
introduction, however, had coincided with the second oil crisis and the system 
lurched from one crisis to the other, each being resolved by a devaluation or 
revaluation within the system to maintain the illusion that it remained intact. 
It was similar to a ‘crawling peg’ arrangement, but to dignify it with this 
description would be totally to exaggerate the orderliness of its workings and to 
forget the whiff of fear surrounding its operation. Within the space of three and 
a half years, a gap on almost 30 per cent had opened up in the exchange rates of 
the strongest (German DM) and weakest (Italian Lire) currencies. But then 
French economic policy converged with the rest, and a calm descended on the 
markets. The pervious turmoil was conveniently forgotten (JORDAN-
WAGNER, 1994). Little now seemed to disturb the serenity of European 
exchange rates and toward the end of the decade several non-members joined 
the system – Spain in June 1989, the UK in October 1990 and Portugal in April 
1992.  It was against this backdrop that in February 1992 that the Treaty of 
Maastricht was signed (ISSING, 2008). 
Richard Griffiths  
 
 
 
17 
 
The design for economic and monetary union was based on five 
requirements that had to be met before being accepted into the single currency. 
First, countries had to have maintained stable exchange rates within the ERM 
for two years preceding membership. There then followed two fiscal targets - 
the stipulation that the annual government deficit should not exceed 3 per cent 
and that the level of sovereign debt should be no higher than 60 per cent. 
Presumably assuming that these requirements were met, there followed two 
further targets (or consequences) for the rates of inflation and for the cost of 
long-term borrowing. But these were given a further tweak in the direction of 
monetary prudence by expressing the targets not in terms of the average for the 
group, but in terms of the three lowest in the group, regardless of their relative 
size or importance. Thus inflation was not to exceed this target by more than 
1.5 percentage points and long-term interest rates were not to be more than 2 
percentage points higher. Generally, these requirements were perceived at the 
time to be deflationary and this was interpreted as a concession to German 
demands as the price for surrendering its own domestic currency, which had 
been exceptionally successful in this respect. And what was good for Germany 
was presumably good for the rest of us as well (GARRETT, 1993).  
Although the design has the virtue of simplicity, there are several 
curious deficiencies. For a start, the target for the deficit is absolute and only in 
one direction. It offers no opportunity for offsetting better performances (lower 
deficits or even surpluses) against an overshoot. If a deficit comes as a result of 
a recession, there is still an obligation to impose a deflationary budget. There is 
no scope at all for the kind of deficit financing engaged upon by the US in the 
shadow of the recession following the Lehman crisis and staying within the 
rules. Secondly, there is an inconsistency between tolerating a government 
deficit, albeit 3 per cent,  and the objective of holding down the level of external 
sovereign debt. The only way to avoid steadily accumulating a relatively 
greater debt is either to grow faster than 3 per cent that is added to the debt 
burden (BUITER; CORSETTI; ROUBINI, 1993). Growing consistently, or 
even sporadically, faster than 3 per cent per annum is something that the more 
advanced European economies have struggled to do since the first oil crisis of 
1973. On the other hand, growth ‘convergence’ for the less advanced economies 
was almost a religion among European economists, as they utilized untapped 
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productivity resources and invested the convergence or cohesion funds 
transferred to them from the EU budget. Unfortunately, the recipe for growth 
usually entailed a trade-off in terms of higher inflation (FINGLETON, 1999; 
LEONARDI, 1995). This, in its turn would create a further problem. Locked 
first into fixed exchange rates, which precluded any currency depreciation, and 
later locked into a single currency and, furthermore, deprived of domestic 
monetary instruments, there were few options for dealing with the cumulative 
inflationary results. Finally, the interest rate target is an implied derivative 
from achieving the prescribed budget discipline and seem to be left to the mercy 
of the markets. This is eminently sensible, if the market is assumed to operate 
rationally and predictably. If it does not, however, governments are left with 
pitifully few short-term policy measures to alleviate the situation, and so too 
were the officials of the European Union. The stance of the monetary 
authorities was to be that there would be no ‘ bail-out’ of economies in 
difficulties and therefore there was no provision of funds to cover just such an 
eventuality. 
 
Implementation 
The Maastricht treaty envisaged three steps whereby the new European 
currency would be created. In the first phase, capital controls would be removed 
and inter-bank cooperation would pave the way for the creation of a more 
central monetary authority. The second stage began with the creation of a 
European Monetary Institute and the five criteria agreed in Maastricht were 
enshrined in a Stability and Growth Pact, which was to be monitored by the 
European Commission. At the end of this stage, exchange rates would be locked 
together and the European Central Bank would be established. At this stage the 
euro was introduced as a means of transactions, but the launch of the currency 
into circulation would wait for four years (ISSING, 2008). That moment took 
place on 1st January 2002. I was in Rome that day and still remember how, at 
the end of the day, I examined the loose change in my pocket to discover also 
coins minted in Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands. I should add that the 
novelty soon wore off. By then, however, things were already going badly 
wrong. 
 In May 1998 eleven members of the EU were declared to have met the 
conditions for euro membership and became the first wave to adopt the new 
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currency. Two other members, namely Denmark and the UK, had acquired opt-
out clauses. This left only Greece and Sweden as members deemed ineligible, 
and Greece was admitted into the new currency in January 2001. For the 
record, all subsequent members of the European Union assumed the obligation 
to join the euro area, when conditions had been met. Slovenia did so in 2007, 
Cyprus and Malta joined the following year, Slovakia acceded the year after 
that and, finally in 2011 Estonia became a member.  
But let us return to those heady halcyon days of Europhoria as 
countries lined up to join the new currency area. One criteria was that they 
should have a government debt ratio of no more than 60 per cent of GDP, but 
should it be higher at the moment of entry, that it should be diminishing  at a 
“satisfactory pace”. If we look at the statistics that policy-makers had before 
them at the time, in the two years before joining, three countries - Belgium, 
Italy and Greece - had debt ratios already towering above 100 per cent of GDP. 
Although they showed some decline this was at a rate that would still leave 
them far outside the target range two decades later. Greece too, had a debt ratio 
hovering around 100 per cent. Five other members - Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Portugal and Spain - had debt ratios between 60 and 70 per 
cent.  
 
Table 1:  Government Debt:GDP Ratio (%) 
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Ireland 
1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 
66.1 65.6 124.7 121.3 59.0 57.3 57.3 58.2 61.7 61.4 65.8 59.2 
Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Greece 
1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 2000 2001 
123.2 121.9 6.7 6.9 73.4 71.5 62.5 60.8 68.1 66.5 102.8 99.7 
Source: European Commission, European Economy. Statistical Annex 1998 and 2001 
 
If the Maastricht treaty had been taken seriously, the introduction of 
the Euro in 1999 should have taken place with seven fewer members than it did, 
and Greece should not have been allowed to join two years later. This, of course, 
is where politics enters the frame. A major step forward on the road to 
integration without four of the six founding members of the European Union 
was plainly unthinkable. Equally a monetary union comprising only Finland, 
France, Ireland and Luxembourg would have made no economic sense 
The Lessons from the Euro Experience v.1, n.2. Jul/Dec.2012 
 
20  
Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations | v.1, n.2, Jul/Dec 2012 
 
whatsoever. So, for the first time, and not for the last, the details of an 
agreement were pushed aside to make way for political expediency.  And, 
having admitted Belgium and Italy with excessive sovereign debt ratios, the 
EU was scarcely in a position to extend the courtesy to Greece whose debt ratio 
appeared less bad than either of these.  Policy-makers work with figures that 
they have to hand, but these figures are often revised afterwards either because 
the data itself is updated or because definitions have shifted. For debt ratios 
these revisions over time have been favourable, and would have allowed 
Portugal to qualify for euro-membership on this criteria. For Greece, however, 
the situation was slightly worse(EUROPEAN COMISSION. European 
Economy, Statistical Annex, 2011).  
 
Table 2: Net government borrowing (-) or lending (+) as % gdp 
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Ireland 
1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 
-2.8 -2.6 -2.6 -2.3 -1.4 -0.2 -3.1 -3.0 -3.0 -2.6 +0.6 +1.2 
Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Greece 
1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 2000 2001 
-3.0 -3.7 +1.6 +1.0 -2.1 -2.9 -2.7 -2.4 -2.9 -2.4 -2.7 -3.1 
Source: European Commission, European Economy. Statistical Annex 1998 and 2001 
 
A second Maastricht criteria was that current government deficits 
should not exceed 3 per cent of GDP. At first sight, the record on this score was 
remarkably good but the results conceal a great deal of statistical and 
definitional creativity. Pension funds were creamed and capital assets sold and 
included under current revenue; parts of government debt were conveniently 
parked out of sight and GDP figures were massaged upwards, by as much as 10-
20 per cent (BOS, 2008. FN 15). The impact of changes in methods and 
definitions in the Netherlands in 2001, for example, to raised its GDP by 4.5 per 
cent and reduced its debt ratio from 52.95 to 50.7per cent (CBS, Press Release, 
1.6.2005). There was plenty of room for further revisions, if efforts were taken 
to include the ‘black economy’ in official estimates as Italy did in 1987, thereby, 
in one leap, overtaking the UK as the world’s fifth largest economy (SIESTO, 
1987). Even so, Italy and Greece still failed to meet the Maastricht criteria on 
this point, but were still admitted. The reason was simple. If one was going to 
ignore a mountain of debt, who was going to quibble over a couple of decimal 
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points? In this particular case, historical revision had not been too kind to 
Portugal, Spain and Greece, all of which now have fallen above the three 
percent range and therefore the official qualification threshold. 
 
Management 
Once the Euro had been introduced, it was for the European Central Bank and 
the ministers of finance of the Eurozone to manage the new currency. The 
backbone for monetary discipline was the so-called Stability and Growth Pact, 
that took over in their entirety all the Maastricht criteria. One of these was that 
budget deficits should be no higher than 3 per cent of GDP. This was first 
seriously challenged in 2001-2 when a temporary recession led to a surge in 
budget deficits and threatened to push France, Germany, Italy and Portugal 
over the threshold. It was ironic that this crisis should embroil Germany since it 
had been largely responsible for insisting on a strict and restrictive rule in the 
first place. Had the rule contained some counter-cyclical provisions such a 
development would never have caused a problem but that was not the case. 
Indeed breaching the rules could invoke sanctions in the form of fines 
equivalent to 0.5% of GDP. But these sanctions were not automatic. 
Instead of accepting the discipline of their own rules, France and 
Germany together began a campaign for ‘easing’ them. As a result of their 
combined pressure, a recommendation by the Commission that the two 
countries take immediate measures to rectify the position was overruled by the 
finance ministers at their meeting in November 2003 (COLLINGON, 2004).  In 
2005 the ministers, against the misgivings of the ECB, relaxed the rules 
themselves in a way that allowed the ministers to take a longer-term view of 
budget perspectives and which permitted countries with a debt ration below 60 
per cent a budget deficit of 1 per cent of gdp, but which held countries with a 
deficit of over 100 per cent to achieving a balanced budget or even generating a 
surplus (FISCHER; JONGUN; LARCH, 2006). Significantly, nothing was done 
to strengthen enforcement mechanisms and the new regime was repeatedly 
flouted by countries as Austria, Greece, Italy and Portugal. The reason was 
simple. Once the rules had been bent in favour of the strong, they lost the moral 
authority to reimpose them on the weak even if they had the inclination to do 
so. 
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Table 3:  Government Debt:GDP Ratio (%) 
 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 
Austria -2.7 -2.9 -4.3 -2.9 -3.0 -3.4 -5.9 -4.1 -3.1 -3.5 
Belgium -0.6 0.0 +0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -2.7 -0.1 -0.3 -1.3 
Finland +1.6 +6.8 +5.0 +4.0 +2.4 +2.3 +2.7 +4.0 +5.2 +4.2 
France -1.8 -1.5 -1.5 -3.1 -4.1 -3.6 -2.9 -2.4 -2.7 -3.3 
Germany -1.5 1.3 -2.8 -3.7 -4.0 -3.8 -3.3 -1.6 +0.3 +0.1 
Greece -3.1 -3.7 -4.5 -4.8 -5.6 -7.5 -5.2 -5.7 -6.4 -9.8 
Ireland +2.7 +4.7 +0.9 -0.4 +0.4 +1.4 +1.6 +2.9 +0.1 -7.3 
Italy -1.7 -0.8 -3.1 -2.9 -3.5 -3.5 -4.3 -3.4 -1.5 -2.7 
Luxembourg +3.4 +6.0 +6.1 +2.1 +0.5 -1.1 0.0 +1.4 +3.7 +3.0 
Netherlands +0.4 +2.0 -0.2 -2.1 -3.1 -1.7 -0.3 +0.5 +0.2 +0.6 
Portugal -2.7 -2.9 -4.3 -2.9 -3.0 -3.4 -5.9 -4.1 -3.1 -3.5 
Spain -1.4 -1.0 -0.6 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 +1.0 +2.0 +1.9 -4.2 
Source: European Commission, European Economy. Statistical Annex 2011 
 
The ‘result’ of fiscal prudence should have revealed itself in two 
‘market’ mechanisms –relatively low government borrowing costs and relatively 
low inflation rates. Indeed both ‘effects’ were apparent. One almost immediate 
impact was a sharp reduction in the range of interest rates governments had to 
pay for long-term borrowing, which was in sharp contrast to the period leading 
up to the adoption of the Euro (EHRMANN et al, 2011). What is slightly more 
disturbing is why this should have been so. In economic theory markets 
function properly when there is transparency, shared knowledge, low  
transaction costs and economically rational actors. Government debt should be 
one of the more predictable markets. Nonetheless the rate of interest paid on 
the debt of a poor, debt-burdened economy renowned for its fiscal laxity (like 
Greece) and  on that of a rich, relatively debt-light economy known for its fiscal 
rectitude (like Germany) was virtually identical. Few, however, remarked on 
the irrationality and unpredictably of capital markets. One effect was to allow 
countries to refinance their debts relatively cheaply, and thus removing the 
market penalty on persistent deficits at a time when the political sanction had 
also been abandoned. For the poorer economies, high government debt levels 
were refinanced far below those prevailing in previous decades. There was little 
incentive to trim excessive deficits back to the 60 percent threshold and both 
Germany and France (not to mention Austria, Belgium, Greece, Italy and later 
Portugal) allowed themselves the luxury of higher levels of sovereign debt that 
than stipulated in the Stability and Growth Pact.  
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Table 4:  Government Debt: GDP Ratio (%) 
 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 
Austria 67.2 66.5 67.1 66.5 65.5 64.8 63.9 62.1 60.7 63.8 
Belgium 113.7 107.9 106.6 103.5 98.5 94.2 92.1 88.1 84.2 89.6 
Finland 45.7 43.8 42.5 41.5 44.5 44.4 41.7 39.7 35.2 34.1 
France 58.8 57.3 56.9 58.8 62.9 64.9 66.6 63.7 63.9 67.7 
Germany 60.9 59.7 58.8 60.4 63.9 65.8 68.0 67.6 64.9 66.3 
Greece 94.0 103.4 103.7 101.7 97.4 98.9 100.3 106.1 105.4 110.7 
Ireland 48.5 37.8 35.5 32.1 30.9 29.6 27.4 24.8 25.0 44.0 
Italy 113.7 109.2 108.8 105.7 104.4 103.9 105.9 106.6 103.6 106.3 
Luxembourg 6.4 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.1 6.3 6.1 6.7 6.7 13.6 
Netherlands 61.1 53.8 50.7 50.5 52.0 52.4 51.8 47.4 45.3 58.2 
Portugal 49.6 48.5 51.2 53.8 55.9 57.6 62.8 63.9 68.3 71.6 
Spain 62.3 59.3 55.6 52.5 48.7 46.2 43.0 39.6 36.1 39.8 
Source: European Commission, European Economy. Statistical Annex 2011 
 
Another result of the low prevailing interest rates was to fuel asset 
bubbles and the growth of speculative banking practices. But surprisingly, the 
impact on prices was relatively mute. No country actually breached the target, 
when averaged over the decade. Nonetheless, some countries were persistently 
higher than the three lowest and that difference, although no more than 1-1.5 
per cent a year led to a cumulative gap in price levels of almost twenty per cent, 
and that inflationary gap was measured against some of the most competitive 
countries in Europe. As the competitiveness of Greece, Spain and Portugal was 
gradually eroded, so their economic growth slowed and the capacity for work-
creation was much reduced. The promise of convergence – high growth paid for 
by higher inflation – was turning into an ash of just higher inflation. If 
European demand were to slow, these weaknesses would be cruelly exposed.  
 
Table 3: Average HICP Inflation Rate over the first decade of the Euro 
Lowest 3 Áustria Bélgica Finlândia França Alemanha Irlanda 
1.77  1.98 2.18 1.76 1.91 1.68 1.96 
Itália Grécia Luxemburgo Holanda Portugal Espanha  
2.29 3.36 2.78 1.88 2.37 2.85  
Source: CBS Webmagazine 10.1.2012 
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The Crisis 
Few economists had anticipated the financial crisis that swept through the 
world economy in 2008. The signs of asset bubbles had been apparent much 
earlier. The ratio of real estate prices to earnings in parts of the USA, in some 
Mediterranean countries (as well as in Ireland and the Netherlands) had already 
reached levels that would prove difficult to sustain, but an adjustment need not 
necessarily precipitate a collapse. Ironically, it was the fact that such 
adjustment was underway that precipitated the crisis as people in the USA 
defaulted on their housing loans. This would impact directly on those financial 
agencies directly involved in the housing market, and it did. The Lehman 
Brothers, Freddie Mac and Freddie May were soon all in financial difficulties 
and Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on 15th September 2008. What tilted 
a sectoral crisis into a truly global one was the at that  Lehman Brothers had 
sold on the ownership of some of its mortgage assets to other banks, but in 
forms that made it difficult to assess the risk involved. Other banks held these 
poisoned assets and noone knew which banks they were and what was the 
degree of the exposure. Inter-bank lending, which served to lubricate the world 
economy, contracted virtually overnight and the impact of the resulting ‘credit 
crunch’ reverberated through the developed economies of North America and 
Western Europe (EICHENGREEN et al, 2009).  As far as the Eurozone was 
concerned, attention rapidly focused on four countries, rather ungraciously 
known as the PIIGS – Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. 
 
Table 4. Government Debt and Deficit Data for “PIIGS” countries 
 Portugal Ireland Italy Greece Spain 
Government deficit 
2008 -3.5 -7.3 -2.7 -9.8 -4.2 
2009 -10.1 -14.3 -5.4 -15.4 -11.1 
2010 -9.1 -32.4 -4.6 -10.5 -9.2 
2011 -5.9 -10.5 -4.0 -9.5 -6.3 
Government debt 
2008 71.6 44.4 106.3 110.7 39.8 
2009 83.0 65.6 116.1 127.1 53.3 
2010 93.0 96.2 119.0 142.8 60.1 
2011 101.7 112.0 120.3 157.7 68.1 
Source: European Commission, European Economy. Statistical Annex 2012 
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Let us start with Ireland. Ireland had been almost a show-case country 
for the European Union. It was the “Celtic Tiger” that, with financial support 
from the European Union, had transformed itself from a lesser developed part 
of the Continent into one that had overtaken the UK in terms of per capita 
national income. All of its financial indicators conformed to the targets of  the 
Stability and Growth Pact. But none of this reflected the growing instability of 
the private sector. Banks had overextended themselves by borrowing cheaply 
on international markets and fuelling a ‘property bubble’ of impressive 
dimensions. Property prices had already begun to slide in 2007, but collapsed as 
the credit crisis struck the country. To stem a possible run on overextended 
banks the government first guaranteed all bank deposits and, a year later, 
effectively nationalized the banks’ bad debts. This was against the backdrop of 
a gathering recession that eroding government income and a programme of 
fiscal restraint. As the government’s borrowing requirement ballooned and the 
level of sovereign debt soared, the credit lines began understandably to tighten 
(LANE, 2011). In November 2010, the country accepted a ‘bail-out’ package of 
€67.5 billion supplied by the IMF and the European Union (with three non-euro 
countries - UK, Denmark and Sweden - contributing individually) on condition 
that the government enact further measures to bring government spending 
under control. 
 For the purpose of this article, Italy, Portugal and Spain fall almost 
into the same category, though there are marked differences between them. 
They are all countries whose competitive positions were eroded during the years 
of the build-up to, and adoption of, the euro when the impact of price and 
inflation differentials could not be rectified by currency depreciation. Nailed to 
a 21st century version of the gold-standard, economic equilibrium depended 
increasingly on domestic deflation, to reduce prices, or on economic reform, to 
increase competitiveness. When a country does neither, the foundations of 
economic growth become eroded and they become increasing vulnerable to the 
impact of cyclical downturns. In the case of Spain and Portugal, the situation 
was aggravated by a speculative property boom, similar to that which had 
characterized developments in Ireland. In these countries, too, when the bubble 
burst, the subsequent contraction of the construction sector led the slide into 
recession with rising unemployment and a burgeoning fiscal deficit. In Spain 
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the impact was cushioned by the relatively low level of government debt but for 
Portugal the twin demands of rolling over debt and funding the current deficit 
stretched the confidence in the government’s ability to pay (BLUNDELL-
WIGNALL; SLOVIK, 2011). In May 2011 the European Union the ECB and 
the IMF (jointly known as the Troika) contributed to a Portuguese ‘bail-out’ of 
€78 billion, conditional on new austerity and privatization measures. Italy has 
been caught in the back-wash of these developments. Although it has a 
relatively high level of debt, its repayment schedule is not tight and much of the 
debt is held domestically. Moreover, its current deficit levels are not out of line 
with those elsewhere in Western Europe. With markets jittery, there were 
doubts over the ability of Italy’s ability to sustain these debt levels given the 
erosion of its competitiveness and growth potential and concern over the 
inability of the government to cut expenditure and introduce reforms. As the 
cost of borrowing edged ever higher, the Berlusconi government stepped down 
and was replaced by an emergency technocratic government deemed capable of 
enacting the necessary reforms. 
 We can now turn to Greece. The country entered the Euro two years 
after the start because the European Commission and member states were 
uncertain whether it could maintain the necessary discipline. They should have 
stayed skeptical, but as the Greek government managed to manipulate its 
budget deficit to a record low of 2.7 per cent in 2000, the doubts were laid aside 
and Euro membership was granted. The latest revised data for the year 2000 
shows a deficit a full one percentage point higher. Whatever the true figure, it 
was the best result Greece managed to achieve since thereafter the deficits 
annually crept ever upwards but initially, because the economy was still 
growing strongly on the back of cheap credit, not so the level of debt. Although 
successive Greek budgets became more profligate, from 2005 the debt levels did 
begin to respond. In that year, the Commission revealed systematic 
underreporting of deficits by the Greek government and it started proceedings 
against it. These persisted until 2007, but stopped short of applying sanctions 
(EUROPEAN COMISSION, 2005). Meanwhile, in 2006 the Greek government 
attempted a new approach which had to succeeded would have slashed the size 
of the deficit and weight of debt by a quarter. In September 2006 it suggested 
that the national income be raised by 25 per cent to include the (unreported) 
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‘black economy’. This was rejected by Eurostat officials but they did allow an 
upward revision of 9.7 per cent. 
 The recession hit Greece hard. Competitiveness had been deteriorating 
and its shipping and tourism industries were particularly vulnerable to a 
cyclical downturn. The Greek budget forecast for 2009 was originally for a 
deficit of 3.7 per cent, down from the 5 per cent reported for 2008. By October 
of that year the two figures were revised upwards to 12.5 per cent and 7.7 per 
cent respectively. The European Commission’s (2010) judgement was damning.  
While accepting that Greek statistical recording and reporting was a mess, it 
also suggested that figures had been deliberately manipulated for political ends. 
The implications were that Greek financial reporting was uncontrolled and 
uncontrollable. Several months later Der Spiegel (2010) revealed that Goldman 
Sachs had connived in the underreporting of government debt by arranging 
currency swaps at fictitious rates that concealed the true level of government 
indebtedness.  
 The spiraling levels of Greek indebtedness undermined any remaining 
confidence of markets in the ability of the government ever to redeem them. 
Interest rates on new Greek borrowing shot skywards and in April 2010 the 
government applied for a loan of €45 billion to cover its borrowing 
commitments for the rest of the year. A month later, after imposing savage 
budget cuts, and provoking a bitter public reaction, it received a bailout of €110 
billion from the IMF, the ECB and the EU. By now, the impact of the 
recession, reinforced by the government’s deflationary policy, were further 
undermining tax receipts. The Troika responded in October 2011 by offering a 
second bail-out worth €130 billion, on condition that Greece produce a 
convincing and effective austerity and reform programme. At the same time, it 
pressured private holders of Greek debt voluntarily accept a debt restructuring 
package involving losses of up to 70 per cent on the face value of their loans, 
and at the same time converting them to new longer-term loans at favourable 
interest. It was an all-or-nothing offer, and succeeded in reducing the level of 
Greek debt by €105 billion. A new technocratic government, meanwhile, 
committed itself to bringing the level of sovereign debt back down to 120 per 
cent by 2020 (most recently revised to 117 per cent) – the level at which it had 
stood when the crisis began. 
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Lessons from the Eurocrisis 
The above description of the crisis is a tidy version of events. Reality was rather 
different. The first problem was that Article 125 of the Maastricht treaty 
specifically ruled out the option of a “bail-out” for countries with public debt 
problems. This position designed to eliminate the danger of what economist call 
“moral hazard” whereby relief measures apparently condone and reinforce the 
tendency towards the deviant behaviour that had caused the problem in the 
first place. Thus as the banking crisis was undermining the stability of the 
financial sector in various Eurozone countries, and when markets needed 
reassurance, the ministers of the 27 member states had to agree the basis for 
any intervention. Neither the framework nor the means for intervention were in 
place before hand. When the means were in place, they were scarcely of the 
magnitude to reassure the markets. It did not take a Nobel-prize economist to 
figure out that the size of the ‘bail-out’ funds would be insufficient to resolve 
multiple concurrent crises. Moreover, as the disbursement of the funds was 
made conditional upon remedial measures being taken by the recipient, the 
entire operation doubled the causes of uncertainty, without ever resolving the 
essential question – would it ever be enough?  
 At present, in March 2012, the European Union has agreed to 
strengthen its financial governance. It increased the possibility of implementing 
an “excessive deficit procedure” and introduced a “reverse qualified majority 
voting procedure” (whereby a judgement could only be overturned by a 
majority against) to enable the imposition of sanctions that could amount to 0.5 
per cent of GDP.  A separate intergovernmental treaty would require 
governments to limit deficits to 0.5 per cent of GDP (one per cent if countries 
had a debt level of less than 60 per cent), but with escape clauses for special 
circumstances. These limits should be introduced into national law. Surveillance 
and cooperation measures were also strengthened. At the same time, the 
financial instruments were strengthened. In May 2010, the EU finance ministers 
had created a temporary funding arrangement - the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) with a capital commitment of €780 billion and a 
lending capacity of €440 billion. In December 2010, they agreed to the creation 
of a permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) with a lending capacity 
of €500 billion to take over from the EFSF when it elapses in July 2013. Since 
the EFSF has already lent €192 billion, the open question at time of writing is 
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whether to treat the ESM additional funding, raising the total to €692 billion, 
or not. Whatever, they decide, it will never be enough if a cataclysm does occur. 
  For now, the crisis has apparently subsided. Let us now briefly examine 
the cost and then, speculate about the future. When the crisis broke, I was in 
favour of the European Union maintaining its ‘no bail out’ stance, partly 
because of the moral hazard argument and partly because there was a ready-
made alternative in the form of the IMF. All the EU member states are 
individually members of the IMF and the IMF has both the mandate and the 
means to intervene. One argument is that the IMF might not have had the 
funds, but that could have been resolved by raising its capital. This need not 
have been difficult since the BRIC countries had wanted to do this for some 
time (increasing their voting power in the process) and the EU states could have 
contributed as well. With this resolved, the IMF could have gone into countries, 
bullied their governments, making itself thoroughly resented, and then left. 
Instead, the EU put itself into the middle of this process, despite the fact that it 
was not equipped for the task and that it was not a unitary actor. As a result 
the EU has complicated the rescue plans and heaped disapproval and 
resentment upon itself. This would also have been true of the IMF, but the IMF 
is not trying to build “an ever closer union” as the EU is pledged to do. As 
distrust of Brussels institutions is rising, the EU’s active involvement in various 
austerity programmes will damage its chances of securing referenda for any 
future treaty changes it requires, and moving the reform agenda outside the 
usual democratic circuits will only increase public disenchantment. The EU 
may still weather the crisis, but it could be paying the political price long after 
the monetary costs have been absorbed and forgotten.  
 But has it solved the crisis? At the moment, the markets are calm, but 
markets are hardly a trustworthy barometer. Despite their elevation in 
globalisation literature to almost omnipotent and omniscient status, markets 
have not performed well. In currency markets, they have presided over wild 
swings (both overshooting and undershooting) in exchange rates and they have 
long ignored blatant signs of difficulties in the capacity of debt service by 
certain states. They are now supposed to have been reassured by the new 
firmness of the EU approach, a firmness which at its first test was to give a 
waiver from its solemn obligations to Spain. Spain had overshot its deficit in 
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2011 (8.5 per cent instead of 6.0 per cent) and was given a revised target for 
2012 (5.8 per cent instead of 4.4 per cent). It is good to build exceptions into 
legislation, but it is not good politics to begin with them. The Dutch, hitherto 
one of the ‘best boys’ in the class, has a minority government coalition in 
trouble over meeting the EU’s criterion, and an opposition and the influential 
Central Planning Bureau, opposed. It may become a second country missing its 
obligations. And if it is not the Netherlands, there are several candidates to be 
next in line for special treatment. 
 A further problem lies in the effectiveness of the various austerity 
programmes. Piling deflation on economies that are already contracting usually 
serves to exacerbate the downward trend and could even increase the level of 
deficit or debt, expressed in relation to a lower GDP. The apparent immunity of 
deficits to the medicine prescribed may well again lead investors to question the 
creditworthiness of nation states, but not only them. Several countries that had 
experiences a credit boom in the years before the crisis also experienced inflated 
asset prices, which have not yet fully adjusted to the new realities. In the 
absence of a reappearance of sustained growth, these assets are often still 
lurking at inflated values on bank balance sheets. The next market attack may 
not be one of confidence in governments, but of confidence in banks. If, for 
example, housing prices do not recover in Spain, a run on Spanish banks could 
still occur, confronting the government with the alternatives of financial melt-
down or nationalization of bank assets. This could precipitate another ‘bail-
out’, but this time on a much larger scale than any than have gone before 
(MCRAE, 2012). But even if we ride out these problems, we still have Greece. It 
surely stretches credulity to believe that a country where the tax system is 
inefficient and the population resentful, where the tax evader is a hero and the 
honest man a fool, is going to reduce its sovereign debt level to 120 per cent by 
2020 and run a balanced budget every year, for the next ten-twenty years 
thereafter, until its level of debt reaches 60 per cent.  
 A final consideration lies in the fact that even if the EU resolves the 
debt/deficit issues, we have done nothing to deal with the gap in 
competitiveness that has emerged. It is very difficult to press a 20 percent price 
differential out of the system, especially without the option of devaluation. The 
‘gold bloc’ countries attempted this in the 1930s and failed (EICHENGREEN; 
IRWIN, 2010). My guess is that the Mediterranean countries, trapped within 
Richard Griffiths  
 
 
 
31 
 
the Euro and without the option of domestic protection, may find themselves 
left with a sound fiscal base but with a stagnant economy. The alternative of 
leaving the euro and adopting a new (depreciating) currency is also not an 
attractive option. Even should the Euro survive, for them there is no happy 
ending inside or outside the bloc. 
 
Conclusion 
In May 2008 The European Commission celebrated the tenth anniversary of the 
start of the Eurozone (not the issue of the currency) with the publication of a 
commemorative volume. Writing its forward, the Commissioner for Economic 
and Monetary Affairs trumpeted: 
“A full decade after Europe’s leaders took the decision to launch the 
euro, we have good reason to be proud of our single currency. The economic and 
monetary union and the euro are a major success. For its member countries, 
EMU has anchored macro-economic stability, increased cross border trade, 
financial integration and investment. For the EU as a whole, the euro is a 
keystone for further economic integration and a potent symbol of our growing 
political unity. And for the world, the euro is a major new pillar in the 
international monetary system and a pole of stability for the global 
economy.”(EUROPEAN COMISSION, 2008, iii) 
It is sad to reflect, now, that the design was faulty, the implementation 
flawed, the management lax, the crisis mishandled and that the future still 
remains uncertain. To push forward towards even more ‘European’ solutions, to 
see the crisis as an opportunity, would at this moment be a mistake. The public 
is not ready for such a move, and are unlikely to forgive (yet another) attempt 
to do things above their heads, if not behind their backs. For the moment, it 
would be a considerable achievement to hold the stability of the currency area. 
The Euro is easily salvageable, if not necessarily with its current membership. 
Once matters have settled, there will be the time to find structural solutions and 
to continue on the road of what, for all its shortcomings, has been one of the 
greatest achievements of post-war European history. And when we offer lessons 
to others, it may be with a little more modesty and humility that has often been 
the case in the past. 
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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the European experience with economic and monetary 
union from three perspectives – the design, the implementation and the management of 
the euro – before exploring the implications of the current crisis. 
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